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The American experience with 
occupational safety and health regulation 
James R. Chelius* 
The significant changes in American occupational safety and health policies are now 
over 10 years old. This paper reviews and integrates the empirical studies on the impact of 
.this regulation. The evidence indicates that government mandated safety standards have 
had little or no beneficial impact on the workplace. Because of the long tenn nature of the 
problems, there is no evidence on the effectiveness of health standards; however several 
studies indicate such standards are quite inefficient. The workers' compensation system 
which was hoped to have influenced prevention with its price incentives has yielded mixed 
results. The introduction of the system appea~s to have enhanced safety; however higher 
benefits are associated with higher reported accident rates. 
The optimal mechanisms for controlling occupational safety and health are not obvious. 
While the appropriate fonn of regulation surely varies across countries, much may be 
learned from other experiences. It is the purpose of this essay to review American occupa-
tional safety and health regulation so as to provide a basis for the reader to detennine the 
lessons which are generalisable to their country. Regulation of occupational safety was one 
of the earliest fonns of gov~ernment intervention in the American workplace. Although 
such legislation is over 100 years old, 1 its character has dramatically changed in the past 
decade. This new interest in occupational safety and health has given rise to a substantial 
number of empirical studies about the workplace impact of such regulation. It is these 
empirical studies that will be emphasized in this review. 
The first section briefly describes the legal structure of regulation which includes both 
the fed~ral Occupational Safety and Health Act 19 70 ( OSH Act) and the individual state 
workers' compensation laws. The surv~ey of empirical results is divided into 2 sections; 
one on the OSHAct" arid a second on wo.rkers' compensation laws. Current developments in 
American occupational safety and health regulation are then reviewed followed by a 
conclusion. 
The regulatory fram~ework 
American policy toward occupational safety and health has two tundamental goals: the 
prevention of accidents and disease and the provision of medical care and income security 
to injured workers. The government's role in the pursuit of these goals has many facets: 
however, the policies which fonn the heart of our regulatory effort are the OSHAct and 
* The Author is an Associate Professor and Director of the ~occupational Safety and Health Center at 
the Institute of Management and Labor Relations, Rutgers Univ~ersity, New Brunswick, New Jersey, 
U.S.A. 
1. The first industrial safety law in the United States was passed in Massachusetts in 1877. 
124 James R. Chelius 
workers' compensation.2 • 
The regulation of industrial safety using government-mandated standards and mspectors 
was carried out at the state level for many years. While no one argued that these modest 
efforts had a large impact (Sands, 1968; Chelius, 1974) no great problem was perceived 
because the trend in injury rates was steadily downward. In the 1960's however, injury 
rates began to rise. This change in injury rates plus a change in political climate which made 
federal intervention on a wide range of issues much more acceptable, combined to yield 
the OSHA ct. Interestingly, it was subsequently demonstrated that this injury rate increase 
was, in large part, a reflection of cyclical factors rather than a reversal of the long term 
trend. The 1960s saw a substantial increase in the number of young and inexperienced 
workers as well as an unusually long upswing in the level of business activity - both factors 
being key detenninants of the injury rate. (Chelius, 1979) The OSHAct provided for 
federal government promulgation of safety and health standards which were to be enforced 
by inspectors with the power to fme erring employers. States were allowed to maintain 
their own programs if such efforts were certified as being at least as effective as the federal 
policy. 
As part of the OSHAct, Congress established a National to study the 
states' workers' compensation laws and make recommendations for their reform. (Report, 
1972) The Commission heartily endorsed the basic principle of workers' compensation, 
that is, the no-fault liability of employers for workplace injuries with the quid pro CfUO of 
employer immunity from tort actions by employees. While the Commission made many 
detailed recommendations for the refonn of the state laws, the key suggestions were for 
substantial increases in the compulsory benefits payable to injured workers. If the states 
did not comply with the key recommendations, the Commission urged the Congiess to 
mandate compliance. Since not all states complied with all recommendations, there were 
several bills proposed in the Congress during the mid-1970s to mandate benefit levels and 
other minimum standards for each state's law. These Congressional proposals did not 
pass, so the workers' compensation system remains based on state statutes. The tlirust 
of the recommendations, however, was embodied in the laws of most states; the Com-
mission largely had its entended impact. Benefit levels for injured workers increased a un-
precedented 43 percent in the period from 1972 through 1980, even after adjusting for tile 
impact of inflation. (Worrall, forthcoming) 
The dual goals of occupational safety and health policy, prevention and security, are 
usually thought of as served respectively by the 2 distinct poficies of the 081/A.t!t attd 
workers' compensation. It has, however, often been asserted that the worters• -
tion system, as well as providing medical and income security te thosewhabecomebijtlred, 
may influence the number of injuries that occur. This assertion is baaeci on the podility 
that mandatory benefits to workers create an extra incentive for employers to 'f'MID1 
injuries and disease. Only recently have the prevention possibilities ofworkell' 
tion been subjected to empirical testing. It is this prevention role rather the ~U.Y 
role of workers' compensation which is examined in this review. We bqlft ho\Ve\fer 
the empirical evidence on the OSHAct. ' ' 
The impact of OSHA 
It is useful t~ divide the review of the Occupational Sifety and Hllllft 
(OSHA, the agency which administers the OSHAct) Into 1 
Although evaluation of both areas is difficult, the relationship ' 
ties and ~ccidents is not encumbered by a long and uneertafn m~at 
2 Other legal systems which are peripherally relevant are tott IUftl 
ance. The workers' compensation system Is intendecl u 1he '*""• 
liability. There are, however, often tort actions which teat the bo1aduy 
sation and the court system. Another relevant social poJqr 11 
provides benefits to totally disabled indMduala ~-of the 
health. We bae llamecl11111ly about the of u the 
but it il fta~ly much more +iva than our knowledp about OCCllp&tlonal 
-.ld ltka to know whether re&lllation has been effective; that is, has it had any 
impact? However, it is also helpful to know if it has been efficient. This means 
&lven the amount of prevention resources that are spent, does the regulation direct 
resources in a manner which maximizes worker well-being?3 
A completely straightforward evaluation of OSHA's impact on safety is not feasible. 
Tbl data base on industrial injuries was substantially changed with the introduction of the 
Jaw in 1970. This, of course, makes simple before and after comparisons impossible. Many 
ef ita impaot have, however, been conducted. The il t1aat 
wlf a ame.JI or ll88Bglble impact on iajury rates. Bvea those most aympa-
folm of acknowledp that its potential for Influencing safety Is 
-.. This occurs hecause of evidence that a fairly small (IQ to 30 
are due to factors potentia11y controllable by government staadarda. 
'If taose injuries PJeventable by to standards are due to momentary 
are unlikely to be observed by oven the most diligent inspection force. Mendel-
9 that oaly S to 10 percent of injuries are due to causes detectable 
(aa opposed to the 10 to 30 percent caused by violations of the standards). 
aotheds used to indirectly measure OSHA's impact on safety are quite diverse. 
(1979a) compared the injury rate experience of firms inspected early in a year to 
talpected late in the year. He reasoned that, if inspections had a beneficial impact on 
this effect would show up more in the annual injury rates of those fmns inspec-
earlr than those inspected late. The impact of inspections on injury rates in the follow-
til rear was also examined. The econometric methodology held a series of other factors 
• l ' ~ : ; t, including changes in employment levels and prior injury rates. The conclusion 
that the 1973 inspections lowered injury rates in small futns. No effect from 1974 
was observed. These inconclusive results warranted a follow-up study which 
COJJducted by McCaffrey (forthcoming). This study repeated the same analysis for 
, 1977 and 1978. He concluded there was no evidence of a benefiCial effect on injury 
from OSHA's inspections during these years. 
(1979) used different methods to examine the impact of OSHA. He com-
pre and post 1970 injury rates using data from one state's workers' compensation 
ayatent. The data were refmed so that only the type of injuries most likely to be influenced 
1tr ltalldards and inspectors was included. These injuries were those resulting from a victim 
"caught in or between" machinery. The results indicate that for the early 1970s 
IICh iajurles were lower than would have been predicted based on past experience; how-
ever, the results do not appear to hold up as subsequent years are added to the data base 
(Viscusi, 1983). 
Another study of a single state compared changes in injury rates over the period 1970 to 
1976 between inspected and non-inspected fmns (Cooke and Gautschi, 1981). They found 
tUt iaapected fums were more likely to have a decrease in injury rates over this period. 
The results applied only to fu1ns with more than 200 employees. This same study exam-
the impact of joint union-management safety committees and found they had a 
effect that was greater than the regulatory impact. 
Tbe most comprehensive examination of country-wide data is Viscusi (1979a). He 
••nined the between various OSHA activities, capital investment in safety equip-
~ There are, of course, more global standards by which one might measure OSHA's efficieDCy. For 
are the prevention resources spent on occupational safety and health as productive as the 
spent on enviromnental or hJghway safety and health. Even more generally, efficiency is 
wltlt a condition in which resources are equally productive acrou an activities m providina 
atllfacticm to individuals. 
• 
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ment, and injury rates. No impact of OSHA on either investment or injury rates was 
discernible. 
The net conclusion of these studies is apparent. Some positive results of OSHA have 
been observed, but even the most optimistic interpretation is one of a small impact. The 
overall weight of the evidence, is that it has not been significantly effective in improving 
safety. 
Health 
In the United States, there is much more of a consensus on the appropriateness of 
regulating occupational health than on regulating occupational safety. Many feel that the 
forces of the private marketplace including unions are able to achieve the desirable amount 
of safety. The key reasons being that both workers and employers are felt to have suffici-
ent information and motivation as to safety hazards and prevention techniques, and 
certainly more insight than government agencies into the specific problems of individual 
worksites. The consistently observed presence of wage premiums for ha1.ardous work 
(Smith, 1979b) and employer difficulties retaining workers in dangerous environments 
(Viscusi, 1979b) are often cited as evidence of the working of these market forces. Many 
of those most critical of OSHA's safety efforts are sanguine about its possibilities in occu-
pational health. While enjoying more support for its potential usefulness, the manner in 
which OSHA has actually regulated health is quite controversial. The agency has and 
continues to place its primary effort on safety rather than health; occasional rhetoric to 
the contrary notwithstanding. In over 10 years only 11 health hazards have been addressed 
with standards; the number of citations has been miniscule. 
The empirical evidence on OSHA's impact is of a different sort than the evidence on 
safety. The frequently long and uncertain interval between exposure and illness makes 
workplace testing of the results derived from health standards a task for the future. In 
many cases, however, we have medical evidence on the likely effectiveness of a particular 
standard if it is observed. Based on the assumption that they are effective, several policy 
evaluations have been done on the efficiency of these standards. As defmed above, the 
general notion of efficiency concerns whether prevention resources are mandated in a way 
which maximizes worker health. 
Even raising the issue of policy efficiency is often viewed as evidence of at least stingi-
ness or more likely anti-worker bias. The point, however, is a simple one. Given a limit on 
our individual and collective willingness to expend resources on prevention, we certainly 
want to allocate these resources in the manner they do the most good. We would not want 
• 
to impose a health standard costing $100 million and saving 10 lives if that meant not 
being able to impose an alternative standard costing the same amount and saving 100 lives. 
Many would, of course, argue that we should do both and perhaps we should; but it 
maximizes worker well-being if we exhaust the opportunities for greater health improve-
ment before we spend prevention resources in areas with lesser rewards.4 
The OSHAct mandated that health standards be established which assure, " ... to the 
extent feasible, ... that no employee will suffer material impainnent of health ... ".Con-
sistent with the probable intent of Congress, OSHA has usually interpreted "feasible" 
(and other qualifiers such as " as far as possible" and "insofar as practicable") as meaning 
technologically possible, rather than efficient. 
The Supreme Court has reviewed this issue in 2 recent cases. In a 5 to 4 vote, the Court 
invalidated a benzene exposure standard stating that a "significant risk" must be demon-
strated before a standard is implemented (Benzene, 1980). This affu1ned a lower court's 
ruling that there was no evidence that the standard bore a "reasonable relationship to its 
4 The issue of how much we should spend on occupational health improvement conapared to other 
uses of our resources is a difficult one. When making such comparisons, real interest rates (Interest 
rates adjusted for inflation) are most often used as the measure of the productivity of foreaone 
opportunities. 
81 a ., t1t.ell 
- ocidy alteawttie" Ia tile 
elect "• lllawl for theqency Ia Ita regadladtla.ef 
A16etllllct \Jelow 1tr tile sectlon on cunent develop11181dB, 08BA 
so IIPtl.y ill the direction of mora flexible workplace hMth 
ptaa attention to eftlcieney caa be from the etnphlgal work 
4oae on the various health standards. It is worth emphalizfq apin tbat dte 
standards is raised here only in the limited context of its implications for 
When the cost of a risk 
~-· 
lllrll1ar --IICJJil 
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the precision impJied by such numbers is specious, the orders of 
We simply cannot eliminate all risks and, once that is it ia 
in a manner which generates the greatest results from our efforts. That 
.,._ to be what we are doing. A much greater beneficial impact on eaployee 
be achieved if we concentrated on reducing low cost of preveatieft rllka 
high cost risks. A poHcy which observed this simple rule wbi1e also 
the least-cost method of prevention for each risk, would minimize the reaources 
...... 8 with other occupational health problems. 
efwolkea' 
mentioned, workers' compensation is potentially important to both goals 
aafety and health policy; prevention sad security. As to the security goal, 
of the cluinges iB workers' compensation the past decade is relatively 
1972 to 1980 (the latest available benefits per $100 of wages 
43 percent. Moreover, nearly all states now benefits automaticaJly 
benefit maximums ue a function of average wage levels. As a result 
during the 1970s, the level of financial security avaUable to iajured 
•aUtimeJdah. 
llJpodleaiMd that workers' compensation may also serve the _ ..... 
beiBa that spend more on prevention when there are 
128 James R. Chelius 
workers' compensation costs to be saved; and the greater the workers' compensation 
benefits to be saved, the more employers would be willing to spend. This simple notion of 
willingness to spend more to avoid a greater penalty is complicated, however, by the 
impact workers' compensation might have on etnployees. In the same manner that workers' 
compensation benefits increase the cost of an injury to the employer, they reduce the cost 
of an injury to the worker and thus possibly lessen his or her prevention efforts. In addi-
tion, the availability of benefits may increase the reporting of injuries by workers. It is also 
possible, of course, that workers' compensation has no significant impact on injury rates. 
The presence and direction of any impact of workers' compensation on injury rates is, 
therefore, uncertain; many diverse incentives are created by such a system and changes to 
it. Fortunately, as public attention focused on workers' compensation in the 1970s, a 
substantial body of empirical evidence accumulated whlch begins to unravel these complex 
• Issues. 
The most fundamental issue, that of whether the introduction of workers' compensa-
tion influenced injury rates is discussed first. The impact of benefit level changes such as 
occurred in the 1970s will then be reviewed. 
State workers' compensation laws were passed in the early twentieth century long 
before systematic high quality data on occupational risks were available. There is, there-
fore, little empirical evidence on any changes in safety behaviour that may have been in-
duced by these legal changes. Only one study has been conducted on this issue (Chelius, 
1976). While the methodology and specific results are reviewed below, the basic conclusion 
was that the introduction of workers' compensation improved the level of occupational 
safety. 
The data used to represent the level of occupational risks were deaths caused by mach-
inery other than motor vehicles. Such accidents accounted for 16 percent of industrial 
deaths. Approxin1ately 87 percent of these n1achinery accidents occurred at the workplace. 
While these data are only a crude proxy for occupational risks, the state rather than federal 
nature of the laws, as well as the differing years of enactment, made possible a methodolo-
gically precise design for analyzing variations in the data. There are variations in death rates 
-
across states each year; some states having workers' compensation laws and some not. 
There are also variations in death rates within each state over time. For some years a state 
had a workers' compensation law and for other (earlier) years it did not. A variety of 
techniques were used to control for the influence of other factors that could have affected 
death rates. These controlled factors included: per capita exposure to machinery, the 
business cycle, medical care, age., sex, en1ployers' liability statutes, legislated safety stan-
dards, and technological change. Using several alternative specifications, the results were 
statistically robust; the in traduction of workers' cotnpensation was asso~iated with a lower 
level of work-related deaths. 
Prior to the enactn1ent of workers' compensation, the assignn1ent of work injury costs 
was handled by the courts using both comn1on law and statutory rules for determining 
negligence. A key perceived defficiency in the negligence system was the low percentage of 
injured workers who were able to collect drunages. Those who were able to collect, how-
ever, typically received larger awards than the benefits auto1natically available under 
workers' compensation . The change frotn court judgments to workers' compensation, 
therefore , was essentially a switch fron1 a low probability of collecting a large paytnent to a 
high probability of collecting a small pay1nent. Ashford and Johnson (1982) have com-
pared the "expected values" (probability tiines an1ount of con1pensation) of both systems. 
This expected value is a tneasure of the injury costs assigned to the en1ployer. These 
calculations indicate that it is very likely that the expected value of injury costs assigned 
to the en1ployer was higher under the ·negligence system than under workers' compensa-
tion. This finding, when integrated with the finding that the introduction of a workers' 
compensation progratn was associated with a higher level of safety, indicates that the 
e1nployers' relative certaintly of being assigned injury costs was n1ore critical than the 
magnitude of the expected value of those costs. In other words, iinposing the injury costs 
on employers in reasonably certain tnanner appears to have been a key factor in raising 
the level of occupational safety. 
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tion of the 2 effects. It is also possible that hjgher benefits reduce the number of actual 
injuries (because the higher benefits induce more preventive activities by employers than 
carelessness by workers), but that the higher benefits lead to such a large increase in repor-
ted injuries that the net association between benefits and the injury rate is positive. 
Another dimension of the reporting phenomenon is the criteria of eligibility for benefits 
(compensability). A study of air traffic controllers clearly indicates that if criteria for 
compensability are loosened, a "reporting" phenomena occurs. Staten and Umbeck (forth-
coming) exan1ined the impact of a 1974 change in the Federal Employee Compensation 
Act which liberalized the standards necessary to den1onstrate that one has been psychologi-
cally "injured" on the job. This change took place during a period in which workers' 
compensation benefits available to an "injured" federal employee were substantial. On 
average, disabled controllers (federal employees) with at least 1 dependent qualified for 
benefits exceeding their normal take home pay. Since a controller would receive compensa-
tion for the duration of disability, more could be made by staying on the compensation 
rolls than by staying on the job. 
After the 1974 legal changes, the nun1ber of disability claims based on psychological 
stress significantly increased. This finding while based on a relatively small work group with 
a uniquely generous workers, cotnpensation system and an injury that is unusually difficult 
to evaluate, makes an important point. The incentives transmitted to employers and em-
ployees n1ay well influence prevention activities and hence real injury rates. However, a 
compensation syste1n with generous benefits and a lax definition of what constitutes an 
injury creates incentives to report a compensable injury when, in fact, one has not occurred. 
Current developments 
The Reagan administration has begun to put its imprint on OSHA. As to safety, the 
primary new direction is the "voluntary protection program" .6 Under this arrangement 
firms certified as having successful safety progra1ns are exen1pted from inspections and 
given priority treatment with any requests for variances from the safety standards. To be 
eligible a firm n1ust have: an ongoing safety program, an internal employee complaint 
mechanisn1, a co-operative atn1osphere between the employer and workers, and a good 
injury rate record. There is no requiren1ent that the employees be represented by a union. 
Given the evidence on the usefulness of worker management safety cotnmittees (Cooke 
and Gautschi, 1981 ), encouraging them seems like a good idea. Giving praise and publicity 
to successful firn1s is also helpful, but it seen1s unlikely that the progran1 will have a signi-
cant overall in1pact. It appears that progratn participants are going to be the firms which 
have been doing a good job. The forn1al rewards of inspection exen1ption and variance 
priority are sn1all and therefore unlikely to induce poor performers into significant changes. 
On health issues, OSHA is currently reviewing several of its standards with the objective 
of (at least in the case of lead exposure) 
... jmproving the cost-effectiveness of the standardfs] and ... re-evaluating the 
feasibility of the standard[s] in some industries. If the outcome of this reconsider-
ation is a modification in the mix of engineering controls and personal protective 
equipment required to meet the permissible exposure lin1it ... such action would 
clearly result in major changes in the en1ployers' compliance programs. (OSHA, 
1982) 
Similar flux in the status of health standards is indicated by the, at least ten1porary, exen1p-
tion of the knitting and hosiery industries fron1 the cotton dust standard. The reason is the 
finding of a Inedical study that " ... indicates little or no excess risk of byssinosis or other 
puhnonary disease in the knitting sector at the low levels [of exposure] which exist." 
(OSHA, 1983) Whether these actions portend a basic restructuring of occupational health 
policy or just the give and take of transitory political squabbles is not clear. 
6 Health programs are also included although as of yet no con1panies are participating on this basis. 
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task. As the evidence of ineffectiveness and inefficiency builds up there are at least 3 direc-
tions we might take. One is deregulation such as has occurred with much of the older price 
and entry regulation. Another, advocated by many economists is to modify the workers' 
compensation system to make it a true tax on injuries and illnesses; thus making use of and 
reinforcing the strengths of the marketplace. Third, and most likely, is a continuation of 
the current regulation with modest and marginal adaptations. We are searching for effective 
and efficient mechanisms for regulating occupational safety and health. The empirical 
• 
evidence to date indicates we are a long way from our goals. 
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